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Although disparate impact theory often is touted as an important
remedy for workplace inequality, in practice, it is less frequently
used. Nevertheless, the theory can be a meaningful remedy for
gender violence survivors who are subjected to adverse employment
actions or termination for reasons that may not appear facially
gendered.
An employee may argue that the action had an
impermissible gender-based disparate impact due to the
disproportionate number of survivors who are women. Consequently,
disparate impact would seem a natural remedy. This Article reviews
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infrequently explored issues that could be interpreted to limit the
theory’s utility. It concludes that those limitations should not bar the
theory’s use. Instead, disparate impact should offer an alternative
remedy for the hidden role domestic and sexual violence plays in
perpetuating women’s economic inequality.
I
INTRODUCTION

A

lthough disparate impact theory has been touted as one of the
most important and controversial developments in employment
1
2
discrimination law, in practice, it is less frequently used. On its
face, this may seem surprising, given the challenges of proving
discriminatory intent as part of a disparate treatment claim and recent
scholarship demonstrating the ways that unconscious bias, rather than
3
intentional discrimination, accounts for inequalities at work.
4
Although some recent commentators have criticized the doctrine,
5
others have called for its revival.
This Article joins the dialog about the practical and potential utility
of disparate impact theory by arguing that it should be applied to
cases evaluating the theory’s applicability to a particular set of cases:
those involving terminations of domestic violence survivors. The
Article situates the issue in the context of two debates: one about the
applicability of disparate impact theory and the other about the
economic stability of domestic violence survivors. In cases in which
a survivor is terminated or otherwise subjected to an adverse job

1 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 702 (2006).
2 See, e.g., Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination:
What’s Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597 (2004) (arguing that
disparate impact litigation is a largely untapped resource that currently is not making a
major impact on employment discrimination law).
3 Recent articles discussing the role of unconscious bias include, e.g., Tristin K. Green,
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 95–99 (2003); Anthony G. Greenwald
& Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945
(2006); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REV. 741, 745–50 (2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006).
4 See infra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.
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6

action because she has been the victim of abuse, she may argue that
the action had an impermissible gender-based disparate impact due to
7
the disproportionate number of survivors who are women. This
Article evaluates the viability of that claim. The Article reviews and
dismisses doctrinal arguments that could be raised to bar survivors’
claims. Instead, allowing such claims would advance the doctrine’s
purpose of eradicating employment practices with discriminatory
8
consequences.
Elsewhere I have argued that adverse actions taken against
domestic or sexual violence survivors should be analyzed as sex
9
discrimination under disparate treatment theory. Accordingly, courts
would recognize an unexplained adverse action against a domestic or
sexual violence survivor as raising an inference of discrimination that
the employer then could rebut through proof that the employer
engaged in an interactive process with the employee but could not
resolve the employment-related concern without taking the adverse
10
action.
That approach would encourage human resources’ “best
11
practices” and safety planning at work. The approach would require
decisions to be based on work-related determinations rather than on
12
This analysis of
inaccurate stereotypes about abuse survivors.
disparate impact complements that proposal by evaluating an
alternative legal theory. I argue that the theory should be available to
domestic violence survivors, just as others subjected to adverse
employment actions may bring both disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims, and that doctrinal objections flatly barring such claims
are inconsistent with the doctrine’s history and purpose.
The Article first reviews both the theoretical underpinnings and the
current doctrinal requirements of the statutory disparate impact claim.
6 Studies consistently show that the vast majority of victims of domestic and sexual
violence are women. See, e.g., CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2001 (2003),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (concluding that eighty-five percent of
all victimizations by intimate partners in 2001 were against women); U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, STATISTICAL TABLES INDEX, tbl.2 (reporting that ninety-two percent of all sexual
assaults in 2005 were committed against women).
7 See, e.g., RENNISON, supra note 6; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6.
8 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
9 See Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work: Reckoning with the Boundaries of
Sex Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61, 73–78 (2008).
10 Id. at 111.
11 Id. at 102–03.
12 Id. at 107–14.
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The Article then focuses on two issues that might pose challenges to
domestic violence survivors’ bringing claims. The first is the
question whether a single employment decision should be considered
a “particular employment practice” subject to disparate impact
review. The second is the question of how to define the appropriate
comparator group in cases such as these in which the criterion for the
decision is closely linked to membership in a protected class. The
Article concludes that disparate impact claims brought by domestic
violence survivors subjected to adverse employment actions because
of their experience with abuse fall squarely within the category of
cases contemplated by Congress and the Court in recognizing
disparate impact claims.
A. Disparate Impact: A Theory of Limits or Untapped Potential?
Generally speaking, disparate impact theory allows recovery when
an employment policy or practice that is neutral on its face has a
disparate impact on a protected group and the policy or practice is not
13
justified by business necessity.
Disparate impact theory has most
frequently been used in the context of written employment tests or
explicit job requirements; the theory has been less successful when
14
invoked outside those contexts.
Some theorists argue that the
theory has had a limited effect and that it is not a promising vehicle
for future change. For example, Michael Selmi argues that the theory
ultimately was a mistake and that a broader definition of intentional
discrimination (under disparate treatment) would more effectively
15
eradicate employment discrimination.
Other theorists similarly
critique disparate impact as a tool for redressing inequality in today’s
16
workplaces. Some scholars have identified practical limits, such as

13

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006).
See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 1, at 705, 738–67 (noting that disparate impact theory has
produced limited results outside of testing context); Shoben, supra note 2, at 598 (asserting
that disparate impact theory has largely untapped potential); Charles A. Sullivan,
Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911,
954 (2005) (noting “little development” in disparate impact law since the 1991 Civil
Rights Act).
15 Selmi, supra note 1, at 706–07.
16 See, e.g., Green, supra note 3 at 136–44 (urging a focus on structural workplace
dynamics); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1231–37 (1995) (arguing that implicit bias should be recognized as a form of intentional
discrimination).
14
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the lack of jury trial, limited remedies, and statutory exemptions, as
17
reasons disparate impact theory is not more widely used.
Yet others argue for the theory’s expanded application. For
example, Charles Sullivan urges a “return to, and revival of, the
18
disparate impact theory.”
He reviews and counters theoretical as
well as doctrinal objections while arguing that disparate impact holds
a “brighter promise” for expansion than does disparate treatment
doctrine, particularly given constrained interpretations of disparate
treatment requirements and our enhanced understandings of
19
unconscious discrimination.
Michelle Travis argues that disparate
impact theory holds great potential for addressing gender-based
workplace inequalities that stem from organizational norms that
enshrine longstanding inequalities such as those involving
20
caregiving.
Joan Williams and Nancy Segal similarly highlight
disparate impact’s utility in challenging workplace practices and
21
norms that penalize those with caregiving responsibilities.
Elaine
Shoben argues that disparate impact is unnecessarily underutilized
and calls for “creative thinking” about additional applications of the
22
theory.
This Article picks up on that call and offers one example of an
application for which the doctrine could afford needed relief.
Domestic violence survivors may be terminated or subjected to
17 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 968; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn
and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 21–24 (2006) (detailing
limited applications of disparate impact law); Shoben, supra note 2, at 598–99 (citing
limited damages as well as difficulties of proof, employer savvy, and failure of the
plaintiffs’ bar to appreciate the theory’s potential as reasons for the theory’s
underutilization).
18 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 984.
19 Id. at 968–1000.
20 Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 37 (2005).
21 Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 108–
10 (2003); see also, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of
“FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of
Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1344–45 (2008) (arguing for
application of disparate impact theory to family responsibilities discrimination); accord
Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 956 (1985) (arguing that disparate impact theory should apply to
pregnancy-related discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act). But see, e.g.,
Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO.
L.J. 567, 615–19 (2010) (arguing that despite its theoretical applicability, disparate impact
has proven to be of limited utility to pregnant workers).
22 Shoben, supra note 2, at 607.
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adverse employment consequences as a result of the abuse.
Because domestic violence survivors overwhelmingly are women,
those adverse employment actions will have a disproportionate impact
based on sex. Disparate impact would seem a natural basis for
redress. Critics no doubt are correct that the reach of the theory will
be limited, that law cannot do the work of social movements in
24
shifting social norms, and that our lack of consensus regarding
employers’ responsibility for remedying subtle discrimination limits
25
That said, disparate
prospects for both legal and social change.
impact remains a viable theory, devised to provide redress in cases
such as these, when “neutral” practices perpetuate prohibited
discrimination. Although the number of cases to which this argument
may apply likely will be small, the analysis offers an example of how
disparate impact could be a more effective tool in remedying subtle
discrimination at work.
B. Context: Domestic Violence
The experience of domestic or sexual violence survivors illustrates
the potential, and some of the challenges, of disparate impact theory.
Domestic or sexual violence survivors often are subjected to adverse
employment actions as a result of their experiences with the abuse.
For example, a domestic violence survivor may be stalked at work by
her partner, and her employer may terminate her, even in the absence
of evidence that her partner actually posed a safety threat to the
26
workplace. Survivors may reflexively be terminated, perhaps due to
unconscious stereotypes that someone coping with abuse would not
be able to simultaneously maintain her job or inaccurate assumptions
27
about her needs as a result of the abuse. In other cases, survivors
may be disciplined or terminated because the abuser interferes with
28
their ability to perform their job functions on time. In those cases,
survivors may bring claims of disparate treatment or hostile
29
30
environment harassment, claims of wrongful discharge, or claims
23

See infra Part I.B.
See Selmi, supra note 1, at 780–81.
25 Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 34–40 (calling for enhanced normative principles).
26 See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 9, at 73–78.
27 Id. at 87–88, 95–101.
28 Id. at 73–77.
29 Id. at 85–88, 91–95.
30 See, e.g., Apessos v. Mem’l Press Grp., 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 322 (Mass. Super. Ct.
2002); Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., No. 78421-3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 3, 2008).
24
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under state or local laws in those jurisdictions that explicitly prohibit
adverse actions taken on the basis of an employee’s experience as a
31
survivor of abuse. Those remedies may or may not afford adequate
32
relief.
Alternatively, a survivor who is terminated because she has been
subjected to abuse may argue that the termination reflects a facially
33
gender-neutral policy that has a disparate impact based on sex. For
example, a survivor may be terminated and told that her termination
was due to circumstances involving her abuse. Whether or not a
survivor discloses that she is coping with abuse, her employer may be
aware of the problem and may terminate her as a result. The
employer may cite performance or attendance issues or may base the
decision on fears that her abuser will pose safety threats to the
workplace. In those cases in which an employer disciplines or
terminates an employee because of her experience with abuse, the
But see, e.g., Imes v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 606
S.E.2d 117 (N.C. 2004) (rejecting the claim); Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (same). See generally Margaret C. Hobday, Protecting Economic Stability: The
Washington Supreme Court Breathes New Life in the Public-Policy Exception to At-Will
Employment for Domestic Violence Victims, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 87 (2010);
Sandra S. Park, Working Towards Freedom from Abuse: Recognizing a “Public Policy”
Exception to Employment-At-Will for Domestic Violence Victims, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 121 (2003).
31 See, e.g., LEGAL MOMENTUM, WOMEN’S LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, STATE LAW
GUIDE: EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC OR SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Sept.
2010), http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/employment-rights.pdf; see also, e.g.,
Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of State
Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669
(2008).
32 See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 9, at 95–104.
33 Similar arguments have met with mixed results in cases brought by survivors and
their families who allege that law enforcement’s failure to respond appropriately to
domestic violence victims’ calls for help led them to suffer harm. For example, a number
of courts have rejected claims. See, e.g., Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 781–
82 (8th Cir. 1994); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2d Cir. 1994); McKee v. City of
Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1989). Others have upheld claims under equal
protection and substantive due process theories. See, e.g., Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712,
715–17 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding an equal protection claim that domestic violence
victims were treated less seriously than similar nondomestic violence victims under
rational basis review); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1529 (D. Conn.
1984) (rejecting a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim challenging police policy of
differential treatment of domestic violence victims); see also, e.g., Okin v. Village of
Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding a survivor’s
claim that police response violated substantive due process based on state-created danger
theory). But see, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (rejecting a
procedural due process claim by a survivor when law enforcement failed to take action to
enforce a protective order).
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decision may be challenged as a facially neutral practice that has a
34
disparate impact based on sex.
There is an intuitive appeal to this argument, given domestic and
35
sexual violence’s disparate impact on women.
Certainly, if an
employer had an explicit policy approving adverse employment
actions taken against domestic violence survivors, such a policy
would easily be seen as having a gendered impact on the workplace,
given the disproportionate percentage of women who are victims.
Indeed, some commentators have concluded that the theory should
36
apply easily to these cases.
But employers are not likely to
expressly adopt such policies. Consequently, the issue becomes
whether an individual employment decision should be insulated from
disparate impact review because, due to the nature of the decision, it
is not likely to be either formalized or publicly disclosed. If disparate
impact is a tool for rooting out discriminatory workplace decisions
that either reflect pretext or perpetuate historic inequalities based on
membership in protected categories including sex, disparate impact’s
37
application would seem natural.
34 The claim might be fashioned in a variety of ways. It could be framed as a disparate
treatment claim. See Goldscheid, supra note 9. Alternatively, a claim could be framed as
a challenge to the underlying personnel policy, e.g., the policy regarding absenteeism or
performance. But that approach would not accurately capture the claim. Unlike other
cases, for example, the “caregiving” challenges in which employees challenge an
employer’s leave policies as having a disparate impact based on sex or pregnancy, a
survivor would not be challenging a stated policy. See infra notes 147–150 for discussion
of those cases. Instead, she would be challenging an employment decision for its impact
on domestic violence survivors.
35 See RENNISON, supra note 6.
36 Maria Amelia Calaf, Comment, Breaking the Cycle: Title VII, Domestic Violence,
and Workplace Discrimination, 21 LAW & INEQ. 167, 186–91 (2003); John E. Matejkovic,
Which Suit Would You Like? The Employer’s Dilemma in Dealing with Domestic
Violence, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 309, 336 (2004); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the
Abused?: Is Termination the Solution When Domestic Violence Comes to Work?, 12
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 294–95 (2006); Nina W. Tarr, Employment and Economic
Security for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 371, 393–94
(2007); Wendy R. Weiser & Deborah A. Widiss, Employment Protection for Domestic
Violence Victims, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POV. L. & POL’Y 3, 6–7 (2004).
37 Indeed, the connection between domestic violence and sex discrimination is so strong
that international treaties explicitly equate domestic violence with sex discrimination. See,
e.g., Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) (stating that violence against women is an “obstacle
to the achievement of equality” and that it “constitutes a violation of the rights and
fundamental freedoms of women,” and recognizing that “violence against women is a
manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which
have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men”). The persistence
of sex-based discriminatory attitudes towards survivors could be extended to the
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Of course, the fact of a termination or other adverse action taken
against an employee would not by itself trigger liability. As with
other cases in which a plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing of
disparate impact, the employer would be able to defend against
liability by establishing that the action was job related for the position
38
in question and consistent with business necessity.
Consequently,
in cases in which performance or attendance problems persisted
despite the employer’s good faith efforts to help the employee safely
negotiate ongoing employment despite the abuse, or when safety risks
to the workplace overall could not be reduced without altering the
survivor’s job status, the adverse action might be justified and the
disparate impact claim would fail.
Analogous arguments have proven successful on behalf of
domestic violence victims who lose housing based on policies
39
disadvantaging domestic violence victims.
However, employment
differs from housing in that employers are not likely to maintain
explicit policies disadvantaging domestic violence survivors whereas
landlords have maintained such explicit policies. In addition, at least
two doctrinal limitations that have evolved in the workplace context
may render disparate impact arguments difficult to sustain. First,
some courts have narrowly construed the statutory requirement that a
40
plaintiff prove that a “particular employment practice” caused the

employment context, in which termination of domestic violence survivors because of their
experience as survivors could similarly be treated as sex discrimination.
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). See infra Part II.B.
39 See, e.g., Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Vt. 2005) (upholding
sex discrimination claim under Fair Housing Act when landlord sought to evict domestic
violence victim less than seventy-two hours after her husband assaulted her); Alvera v.
Creekside Vill. Apts., HUD ALJ No. 10-99-0538-8 (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
Portland, Or., Apr. 16, 2001) (policy discriminating against domestic violence victims
violate prohibitions on sex discrimination); see also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(9) (2006)
(providing, inter alia, that applicants for Section 8 housing vouchers cannot be denied
housing because of their experiences with domestic violence and that an abuser’s actual or
threatened violence cannot be the basis for adverse decisions regarding the victim’s
housing); Emily J. Martin, Fair Housing for Battered Women: Preventing Homelessness
Through Civil Rights Laws, 27 CORNERSTONE 6 (2005), available at http://www.aclu.org
/pdfs/fairhousingforbatteredwomen072806.pdf (discussing theories and citing cases); PUB.
HOUS. MGMT. & OCCUPANCY DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC
HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 216–19 (2003) (recommending preferences for
domestic violence victims and discussing best practices for maintaining victims’ housing
status). See generally Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination
Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377 (2002).
40 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
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41

disparate impact. Second, the survivor would have to establish the
requisite statistical impact, even though she may have been the only
42
This Article
employee who she was aware was similarly treated.
will evaluate each of those issues in turn.
II
DISPARATE IMPACT: TESTING THEORY AND DOCTRINE
A. Theory
The history of disparate impact doctrine’s development as a tool to
eliminate employment discrimination has been well documented and
43
What is less settled are its purposes,
won’t be repeated here.
rationales, and goals.
Drawing from the oft-stated original
articulation in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., disparate impact theory has
been seen as prohibiting practices that are “fair in form, but
44
discriminatory in operation.” As the Supreme Court stated:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to “freeze” the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.45

The Court saw Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate as
demanding the removal of all “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment,” when those barriers have the effect of
41 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 14, at 976–79 (discussing limitations); Travis, supra
note 20, at 36–40.
42 Cf., e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White
Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2027 (1995) (discussing difficulty in
identifying policies and their impact in a hypothetical claim by an African American
woman who was denied promotion).
43 See, e.g., Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and
Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 431 (2005); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Kingsley R.
Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” a Codification of Griggs, a Partial
Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 287 (1993); Martha
Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory
and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983); Selmi, supra
note 1, at 708–33.
44 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
45 Id. at 429–30.
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discriminating against a historically disadvantaged group.
It saw
Congress’s goal of equal opportunity as encompassing the removal of
47
In other words, if the
all “‘built-in headwinds’” to equality.
employer’s conduct operates to exclude or disadvantage protected
groups, the conduct would be permitted only if it is related to job
48
performance.
Yet this language doesn’t fully capture the doctrine’s underlying
theory or its goals. Richard Primus has posited two primary potential
49
rationales.
In his view, disparate impact can be seen either as an
“evidentiary dragnet designed to discover hidden instances of
intentional discrimination” or as a “more aggressive attempt to
dismantle racial hierarchies regardless of whether anything like
50
intentional discrimination is present.” He concludes that an account
that focuses on breaking down historical hierarchy and persistent
segregation is preferable to approaches that focus on the employer’s
51
state of mind.
Sullivan identifies two potential rationales that
describe the same, or very similar concerns: reaching intentional
discrimination in cases that lack proof of disparate treatment and
removing unnecessary barriers based on the history of discrimination
52
and subordination.
Under both views, disparate impact draws on
antidiscrimination law’s conceptual roots in tort law by recognizing
that discrimination consists of conduct rather than a state of mind and
by defining “intent” to include the likelihood that a given result will
53
flow from a given action.
The two rationales generally track two

46

Id. at 431.
Id. at 432.
48 Id. at 431.
49 Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 494, 518–36 (2003). Others have adopted his framework in their analyses
of disparate impact discrimination. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test
for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 779 (2009).
50 Primus, supra note 49, at 518. Others have also seen the focus of disparate impact as
focusing on the risk that the challenged practice incorporates or reflects pretext. See, e.g.,
George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1339–43 (1987).
51 Primus, supra note 49, at 536. Others agree that framing the theory in terms of
effects rather than intent holds greater potential to advance equality. See, e.g., Pamela L.
Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 526
(1991).
52 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 964–66.
53 Blumrosen, supra note 43, at 71–72.
47
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competing visions of workplace equality: equal treatment and equal
54
achievement.
The latter rationale in particular, in which disparate impact is
viewed as a tool to address historic barriers, seems consistent with the
structural approach advocated by those who advocate new approaches
55
to workplace inequality. In that sense, it may be thought to be an
56
effective tool for addressing subconscious discrimination. Notably,
Linda Krieger, in her landmark work identifying the role of
“unconscious” discrimination in employment inequality, argues that
disparate impact is an ill-suited tool for addressing unconscious
57
She criticizes disparate impact as a vehicle for
discrimination.
addressing the subjective practices that often are not recognized under
58
disparate treatment’s current requirement of discriminatory intent.
She views the original purpose of disparate impact law as addressing
59
particular problems that had arisen as Title VII evolved. She argues
that disparate impact was not designed to go beyond those contexts to
60
Instead, in her view,
address systems of subjective practices.
disparate treatment should be reconceptualized to reflect the role of
cognition, rather than intent, in the realistic operation of
61
discriminatory decisions. This critique stands in some tension with
accounts of those involved in the Griggs litigation and related policy
development, which define disparate impact discrimination broadly in
62
terms of consequence.
54 Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the
Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 223,
224–25 (1990); see also, e.g., Julia Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The
Application of Title VII’s Disparate Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 869, 903 (1985)
(arguing that disparate impact reflects an equal opportunity concept of equality with goals
of eliminating historical, social, and structural barriers that impede achievement for
minority group members and recognizing the present effects of past discrimination).
55 See sources cited supra note 3.
56 See, e.g., Primus, supra note 49, at 532–35.
57 Krieger, supra note 3, at 1231.
58 Id. at 1230. She rejects disparate impact as a “fix” for challenging those practices,
citing practical concerns with validation studies, political problems with the cost of the
validation studies that would be required, and theoretical problems with the fit between the
original intent of disparate impact theory and the subjective practices with which she is
concerned. Id. at 1231–37.
59 Those problems are employers’ substitution of facially neutral criteria for previously
used race-based classifications and similar reliance on eligibility criteria associated with
successful performance in stereotypically male jobs. Id. at 1237.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1241–43.
62 Blumrosen, supra note 43, at 62, 73.
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From a policy perspective, both approaches require courts to
balance the impact of neutral policies that have a discriminatory effect
against an employer’s legitimate right to promulgate policies
regardless of racial or gendered effects if they truly are directed to
63
central business (or governmental) concerns.
Cases involving
domestic violence survivors may fall under both categories, in that
they may reflect masked discriminatory intent (pretext) or decisions
that perpetuate historic gender-based discriminatory practices.
Accordingly, disparate impact would be applicable under either
theoretical approach.
B. Doctrine
1. Statutory Requirements
Congress’s 1991 codification of disparate impact as a theory of
relief for employment discrimination provides that a plaintiff can
establish disparate impact discrimination by showing that a
“particular employment practice” causes a disparate impact against an
64
employee in a group protected by the statute.
The employer then
has the burden of establishing that the practice is job related for the
65
position and consistent with business necessity.
Even if the
employer makes that showing, the plaintiff can prevail if she
establishes that an “alternative employment practice” exists and that
66
the employer refuses to adopt it.
Consequently, proof of both a
“particular employment practice” and an impermissible disparate
impact are key to sustaining a claim. For disparate impact theory to
apply to a termination or other adverse action taken against a
domestic violence survivor, a court would first have to recognize the
adverse action taken against an individual as a “particular
employment practice” that falls within the statute. As one court
noted, there is “precious little” case law on the meaning of

63

Lamber, supra note 54, at 903.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin). Even if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that each
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, the court may treat
the entire decision-making process as one employment practice if the plaintiff
demonstrates that the elements of an employer’s decision-making process are not capable
of separation for analysis. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
65 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
66 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
64
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“employment practice” as the term is used in disparate impact cases.
Courts consistently apply the doctrine to “practices” such as discrete
68
or express personnel
testing procedures or job requirements
69
policies. However, some courts conclude that the theory would not
extend, for example, to employment decisions that affect a single or
only a few employees, or to employment actions that could be
70
characterized as “single decisions” or “isolated incidents.”
This
could be problematic for a domestic violence survivor. In addition to
the likely absence of an explicit policy authorizing adverse actions
against domestic violence survivors, a survivor may have difficulty
identifying others who also were subject to an adverse action because
of their status as survivors. Yet the statutory language, legislative
history, and the principles underlying the theory do not justify
precluding a disparate impact claim on this ground alone.
Although Title VII generally defines “unlawful employment
71
practices,” it does not define or elaborate how that definition is
meant to differ from the “particular employment practice[s]” required
by the separate provision spelling out proof requirements for disparate
72
impact claims.
As Michelle Travis argues, the term “particular”
73
was used to clarify the issue addressed in Wards Cove concerning
whether an employee could state a prima facie disparate impact case
solely by identifying a “bottom-line” statistical disparity between the
67 Council 31, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 377
(7th Cir. 1992).
68 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (applying disparate impact
analysis to high school diploma requirement); see also, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977) (applying disparate impact to challenge height and weight requirements).
69 For example, policies requiring commencement of leave upon pregnancy would be
subject to disparate impact review. See Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d
670 (9th Cir. 1980).
70 See, e.g., infra Part II.B.2.
71 The statute declares:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
72 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
73 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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percentage of the employer’s workforce that was made up of
members of a protected category and the percentage of that category
74
That issue addresses a concern with
in the relevant labor pool.
causation, not a concern about the type of neutral decision that might
create a disparate impact. In other words, by using the term
“particular,” Congress sought to ensure that an employer-authorized
practice, rather than some other unrelated factor, caused the
75
challenged disparity. Accordingly, the statute requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate that each practice causes the disparity, unless she can
establish that the elements of the employer’s decision-making process
cannot be separated for analysis, in which case the combined
76
processes would be treated as a “particular employment practice.”
The use of the term “particular” therefore clarifies how to handle
“bottom-line disparities” and does nothing to disturb the Griggs
decision’s recognition that a broad range of employment decisions
77
would be subject to disparate impact challenge.
The 1991 Civil Rights Act’s legislative history confirms that the
use of the word “particular” reflects Congress’s concern with
causation in cases involving “bottom-line disparities” rather than an
effort to limit the types of practices subject to disparate impact
78
challenges. As L. Camille Hébert chronicles, the legislative history
reflects Congress’s recognition that disparate impact has been, and
may be, applied to a “wide variety of practices” including tests, job
requirements, leave or other personnel policies, or “other subjective
79
or objective” evaluation procedures or practices.
Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that disparate impact may be used to
challenge “subjective” employment decisions, such as the method for
80
awarding or denying promotions. That disparate impact challenges
have not been widely successful outside the testing context does not
mean that they could or should not be successful in appropriate cases.
74 Travis, supra note 20, at 80; see also Muñoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir.
2000) (recognizing that disparate impact cannot be used to challenge “cumulative effects
of an employer’s practices”).
75 Travis, supra note 20, at 80–82.
76 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B).
77 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
78 See, e.g., Browne, supra note 43, at 328–39 (reviewing legislative history of
“particular employment practice” requirement).
79 L. Camille Hébert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive
Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341, 380 & n.151 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 34
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 572–76; H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 16
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 709).
80 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).

GOLDSCHEID

48

10/28/2011 10:31 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90, 33

2. “Single Decision” Cases
This Part reviews the limited universe of reported cases in which
defendants have challenged the applicability of disparate impact
theory by arguing that the employment decision at issue was a “single
decision” and not a “particular employment practice” that would be
subject to disparate impact review. If a domestic violence survivor
brought a disparate impact challenge to her termination or other
adverse action, the claim might be characterized as raising this “single
81
decision” issue.
The question whether disparate impact theory applies when
subjective decisions may be characterized as “single employment
decisions” has been considered, but not rigorously analyzed, in a
relatively small number of decisions. Some courts have recognized
that a decision can have a discriminatory disparate impact even if it
was a “single decision” that did not reflect an official or repeatedly
applied policy. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust itself was a case
involving a small employer, and the Court there recognized that
82
single decisions could perpetuate discrimination. If the purposes of
disparate impact theory are to eliminate the “headwinds” that interfere
with equality and to facilitate challenges to decisions that have the
effect of adversely impacting a protected group and lack business
justification, one would expect all manner of neutral decisions that
have a negative impact on a protected group to be subject to review,
regardless of the number of employees affected. Accordingly, a
domestic violence survivor should not have to establish that her
employer adopted a formal policy sanctioning adverse actions against
survivors of domestic violence in order to bring a disparate impact
challenge.
In many cases, courts treat disparate impact in a manner that is
consistent with the theory’s stated purpose of eliminating hidden
discrimination by upholding claims that suggest pretext, even absent
traditional proof of disparate treatment. For example, in Council 31,

81 A preliminary question may be whether the decision is the type that is properly
subject to disparate impact review. Although disparate impact is most often thought of in
the context of objective criteria such as tests, it is an important tool for challenging
subjective practices such as terminations or other adverse actions. See, e.g., id.
(confirming applicability of disparate impact analysis to subjective employment decisions
such as hiring, compensation, and promotions); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (listing “subjective decision making” as among the practices that
could be challenged under disparate impact theory).
82 487 U.S. at 990–91.

GOLDSCHEID

2011]

10/28/2011 10:31 AM

Disparate Impact’s Impact

49

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v.
Ward, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a disparate impact
challenge to a layoff decision that allegedly had a racially
83
discriminatory impact.
The appellate court reversed the lower
court’s dismissal and rejected the conclusion that a disparate impact
challenge must identify a “repeated, customary method of operation,”
84
and that it would not apply to a single layoff decision.
The
appellate court reasoned that a decision barring from disparate impact
challenges employment practices that may be characterized as a
“single decision” would be “analytically unmanageable” because
“almost any repeated course of conduct can be traced back to a single
85
decision.” As another court stated, the criteria should be whether a
practice is sufficiently specific and focused for the court to be able to
address “whether it is a pretext for discrimination in light of the
86
employer’s explanation for the practice.”
Indeed, a number of
claims involving single layoff decisions have been recognized as
cognizable under disparate impact theory, even if the plaintiffs
87
ultimately did not prevail on the merits.
Similarly, other challenges to termination decisions or to aspects of
hiring practices have been upheld even though the challenged practice
might have been characterized as a “single decision” and did not
involve formal policies or procedures. For example, in Chaney v.
Southern Railway Co., the court allowed the plaintiff’s disparate
impact claim to proceed based on the former employee’s argument
that he had been terminated as a result of an employer-administered
88
drug test that had a disparate impact based on race. The court did
not require proof that the test had been used in other instances or that
its use was part of the employer’s official policy or procedures.
Similarly, in Conroy v. Johanns, the court allowed a claim to proceed
based on the argument that the employer’s decision to advertise a
83

978 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 376.
85 Id. at 377.
86 Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th
Cir. 1985).
87 See, e.g., Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 2003) (alleging so-called
“balanced workforce initiative” generated reports that set specific racial goals for jobs at
particular grade levels led to subsequent reduction in percentage of black employees); cf.
Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing disparate
impact challenge to layoff decision though finding no statistical impact); Nolting v.
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 799 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1986) (same).
88 847 F.2d 718, 725 (11th Cir. 1988).
84
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position in a job category that required a college degree had a
89
gendered disparate impact. The court rejected the argument that the
decision did not constitute an “employment practice” because the
plaintiff had established inconsistencies in how jobs were posted that
could constitute a “standard practice” and that might indicate a pretext
90
for discrimination. The court did not require a formal showing of a
stated policy; instead it allowed the plaintiff the opportunity to
establish facts that would show a practice that had a gendered impact.
In other cases, courts have recognized that claims involving an
adverse action taken against an individual could be subject to a
disparate impact challenge, even though the claims in those cases
ultimately failed for lack of statistical evidence. A concern about
whether the decisions reflected a pretext for discrimination seemed to
drive the court. For example, in Coe v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.,
the court recognized that an employer’s refusal to admit the plaintiff
to its management training program could be subject to a disparate
91
impact challenge.
The court reasoned that the employer’s policy
with respect to program admission was sufficiently narrow to suggest
92
that it might be a “ploy” to “practice discrimination.” Rather than
taking a formalistic approach and requiring a stated policy or
evidence of repeated conduct, the court recognized that a lack of
apparent business justification for the employment decision might
reflect the type of discriminatory decision disparate impact theory
93
was intended to address.
This flexible approach hews more closely to the broad-sweeping
intent reflected in both Griggs and the 1991 Civil Rights Act (CRA).
To the extent courts are charged with balancing a concern with
perpetuating the effects of discrimination with employers’ interests in
maintaining valid business practices, the “business necessity” aspect
94
of the equation, rather than the “employment practice” requirement,
89

No. 2:06-cv-867, 2007 WL 1830725 (D. Utah June 22, 2007).
Id. at *7.
91 646 F.2d 444, 452 (10th Cir. 1981).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) (setting forth proof requirements under
which a claim will fail if an employer establishes that the challenged practice is job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity). For discussion of the
business necessity defense, see, e.g., Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387 (1996); Andrew C.
Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of
Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1996).
90
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should do the work of protecting the employer’s interest. The
employer should be required to justify its decision if its practice raises
the specter of enshrining or reproducing historic discrimination.
Nevertheless, a number of courts have rejected claims on the
ground that the plaintiff did not identify a “particular employment
practice” within the meaning of the statute. As Sullivan argues, the
objections are not categorically unfounded, but they are
95
“overdrawn.”
When closely examined, virtually all of these
decisions reflect what seem to be concerns with causation or concerns
that disparate impact theory should not be applied in a way that would
endorse quotas or other public policies or that would interfere with
employers’ legitimate, or at least traditional, business practices
(though that analysis would more properly fall within the “business
96
necessity” defense).
Nevertheless, some courts go further in
rejecting claims even though the challenged practices could
reasonably be seen as falling within the theory’s reach.
One group of cases purports to reject claims because the plaintiff
failed to identify a particular employment practice, but a close reading
of the decisions reveals an underlying concern with a failure to
establish causation between the employment decision and the
97
prohibited disparate impact. For example, in Pouncy v. Prudential
Insurance Co. of America, plaintiffs challenged three aspects of the
employer’s practices they claimed had a disparate impact based on
98
race. Although the court stated that those practices were different
from selection procedures such as educational requirements and
aptitude tests, it really was concerned about whether the challenged
99
practices caused the alleged racial disparities. The court recognized
that the plaintiffs presented statistics showing that blacks were
overrepresented in the lower levels of the employer’s workforce but
95

Sullivan, supra note 14, at 976.
See, e.g., Browne, supra note 43, at 327–29 (explaining how a “particularity”
requirement addressed concerns that disparate impact challenges to general decisionmaking processes would lead to routine bottom-line challenges, impair an employer’s
ability to select the most qualified candidate, and pressure employers to engage in quota
hiring); accord Selmi, supra note 1, at 753 (noting courts’ willingness to approve
“common business practices” despite their disparate impact).
97 See, e.g., Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982);
accord Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277 (5th Cir. 1994).
98 Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 801 (dismissing the three “practices” of failing to post job
openings, the use of a “level” system, and the use of subjective evaluation criteria, as
unlike the selection procedures to which the disparate impact model traditionally has been
applied).
99 Id.
96
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found that the statistics did not establish that the three selected
100
Thus, although the court
“practices” caused those disparities.
couched its decision in terms of the plaintiff’s failure to identify
specific practices, its real concern seemed to reflect the issue
addressed in the 1991 CRA regarding whether or when “bottom line”
101
disparities could be subject to disparate impact review.
Similarly, in Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., the court found
that the plaintiffs’ challenge to a “practice” of requiring applicants to
fill out job applications at the plant failed because plaintiffs had not
102
identified a “specific aspect” of the employers’ practice.
But, as in
Pouncy, the court’s real concern was causation: the court explained
that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a “causal connection”
between the alleged policy and the racial imbalance with which the
103
plaintiffs were concerned.
Another group of decisions involved “comparable worth” cases in
which courts rejected disparate impact challenges to compensation
104
systems that resulted in gender-based disparities.
These decisions
state that they rejected claims because the challenges did not involve
105
However, the courts’
sufficiently specific “employment practices.”
reasoning reflected policy concerns about comparable worth and a
reluctance to invoke disparate impact law to impose liability when an
employer applied longstanding market-based compensation
106
systems.
For example, the court in American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees v. Washington, found that the
challenge did not involve the type of “specific, clearly delineated
employment practice applied at a single point in the job selection
100

Id. at 801–02.
See sources cited supra notes 78–80.
102 Anderson, 26 F.3d at 1284.
103 Id.
104 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Muni. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401
(9th Cir. 1985); Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984).
105 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n, 770 F.2d at 1405–06; Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 707.
106 In another decision that also can be seen as declining to use disparate impact
analysis to challenge an employer’s settled policies, the court in Kelber v. Forest Electric
Corp., 799 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rejected a disparate impact claim by an
electrician who was fired due to excessive absences because, in part, her claims that the
defendant’s “job assignment and termination policies have a disparate impact on pregnant
women” was not sufficiently specific. Id. at 333. The court concluded that the plaintiff
had failed to identify any “specific” employment practice that affected pregnant women.
The court also found that the plaintiff had failed to establish the requisite impact. Id. But
it is difficult to imagine how the plaintiff, an electrician in a field and job no doubt
dominated by men, could establish that any policy had a disparate impact on women,
never mind pregnant women.
101
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process,” which, in its view, properly would be the subject of
107
It objected to the use of disparate
disparate impact challenges.
impact theory to “interfere” with complex compensation systems
grounded
in
“surveys,
agency
hearings,
administrative
recommendations, budget proposals, executive actions and legislative
enactments,” and which were “responsive to supply and demand and
108
other market forces.”
The court in Spaulding v. University of
Washington identified related concerns that allowing disparate impact
challenges in comparable worth claims would stretch the theory
109
beyond where it was intended to go.
That court saw the disparate
impact model as a means to challenge particular employment
practices that were not obviously job related and was concerned that
the theory could be used instead as a means to interfere with the
110
market.
Regardless of whether the policy judgment that accepted
market-based practices fall outside the scope of disparate impact
review (presumably because they would not impermissibly enshrine
prohibited discrimination) is correct, these cases should be seen as
hinging on particular policy concerns rather than on an analysis of the
“particular employment action” requirement.
Decisions in related contexts reflect a similar judicial reluctance to
interfere with established market-based practices. In Finnegan v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., the court rejected an age discrimination
claim, concluding that the employer’s financially driven wage and
fringe-benefits cuts were not the type of employment practices
111
disparate impact was designed to address.
In the court’s opinion,
Judge Posner described the policies subject to disparate impact
challenge as policies that “gratuitously––needlessly—although not
necessarily deliberately, excluded black or female workers from equal
112
employment opportunities.”
Judge Posner recognized that the
theory readily would apply to policies that originally had been
adopted for discriminatory purposes, but that had not been changed
113
when the employer eliminated deliberate discrimination.
He
distinguished those cases from the type of across-the-board
compensation reductions brought on by financial adversity that were
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Am. Fed’n, 770 F.2d at 1405.
Id. at 1406.
Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 707.
Id.
967 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1164.
Id.
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not the legacy of deliberate age discrimination.
In this sense, the
court explicitly drew on one of the identified rationales of disparate
impact theory—eliminating the effects of past discrimination—to
reject a claim it found outside the doctrine’s historic scope. That
reasoning would not preclude claims based on a single decision that
perpetuated historically discriminatory biases.
Other pre-1991 CRA cases have rejected challenges based on
determinations that the policy could not be attributed to actions that
were not employer initiated. These decisions can be seen as related to
115
those discussed above concerning causation.
They draw on the
concept, embedded in the 1991 CRA, that the “policy” must be driven
by the employer, rather than other factors such as historical practice,
or the market, to be subject to disparate impact review. But courts
apply this concept in a highly formalistic way. For example, in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v. Chicago Miniature
Lamp Works, the court found that the employer’s passive reliance on
employees’ word of mouth for recruitment was not a “particular
employment practice” within the statutory meaning because it relied
116
on the employees’ rather than the employer’s actions.
Similarly, in
Beard v. Whitley County REMC, the court rejected a challenge to
differential wages and benefits earned by two categories of employees
because the compensation packages were found to be the result of
separate negotiation processes with different unions, not any
117
affirmative steps taken or practices undertaken by the employer.
Although the reasoning identifies a credible concern that challenged
decisions should stem from employer-driven acts, these decisions
draw an artificial line between employer and employee- or uniondriven conduct, when the policies might instead be traced to the
118
Notably, other courts have
employer’s actions or acquiescence.
taken different approaches to similar claims. For example, in contrast
to EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Thomas v. Washington County School Board,
recognized that policies and practices of nepotism and word-of-mouth

114

Id.
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 98–103.
116 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991).
117 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988).
118 See Travis, supra note 20, at 42–43 (criticizing the reasoning of EEOC v. Chicago
Miniature Lamp Works).
115
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hiring served to “freeze the effects of past discrimination” and had a
119
disparate impact based on race.
A few other decisions may prove problematic for a domestic
violence survivor because they explicitly found alleged “practices”
that affected only a single or a few individuals inappropriate for
disparate impact review. Some decisions reflexively state that
disparate impact claims must be directed towards “systemic” results
120
of employment practices.
At least one court indicated that a
“discretionary” decision to deny a new mother leave would not be
121
“appropriate” for disparate impact review.
These cases seem to
reflect the view that disparate impact review is only suitable for
explicit, formal policies—a view that was rejected in Watson v. Fort
122
Worth Bank and Trust.
On close review, however, the facts of those cases seem to reflect
the courts’ judgment that the claims lacked merit rather than on a
categorical judgment whether a “single decision” might ever be
subject to a successful disparate impact challenge. For example, in
Harper v. Godfrey Co., which involved circumstances surrounding
and following a strike by unionized workers, the court rejected a
challenge alleging that the employer’s creation of a seniority list had a
123
racially disparate impact.
The court first reasoned that the
composition of a seniority list cannot be called a “policy or practice”
124
for disparate impact purposes because it “was a single decision.”
The court insisted that to be subject to disparate impact review, the
plaintiffs had to establish that the “manner” in which the list is
125
prepared constitutes a policy that has a disparate impact.
The court
dismissed the policies identified by the plaintiffs but found that even
if the court recognized the alleged policies for purposes of the
challenge, their “limited magnitude” would nevertheless doom the
126
claims.
Similarly, in Wright v. National Archives and Records Service, the
court rejected a claim by an African American civil service employee
119

915 F.2d 922, 925–26 (4th Cir. 1990).
See Harper v. Godfrey Co., 839 F. Supp. 583, 604 (E.D. Wis. 1993), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 45 F.3d 143 (7th Cir. 1995); Wright v. Nat’l Archives &
Records Svc., 609 F.2d 702, 712 (4th Cir. 1979).
121 Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 1988).
122 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
123 Harper, 839 F. Supp. at 604.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 605.
120

GOLDSCHEID

56

10/28/2011 10:31 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90, 33

that a series of incidents relating to the agency’s training programs
127
The court found that the various
discriminated on the basis of race.
actions that allegedly led to the plaintiff’s denial of promotion were
not the type of facially neutral “policy or practice” subject to
128
disparate impact challenge.
The court was concerned that of the
four employees allegedly affected by the “practices,” only one was
alleged to have suffered any harm that was allegedly
129
discriminatory.
The decision went on to reject the plaintiff’s
disparate treatment claims notwithstanding a dissenting opinion that
would have upheld plaintiff’s claims on that theory, and concluded by
characterizing the grievance as growing “out of a positively motivated
intention to better the employment conditions of minority
130
employees.”
Thus, in addition to the court’s concern that no
adverse impact was established, the court also appeared unwilling to
hold an employer liable for what the court deemed to be good faith
131
efforts to diversify the workplace.
Likewise, in Bramble v. American Postal Workers Union, a case
sometimes referred to for the proposition that disparate impact does
132
not apply to decisions that affect a single employee,
the court
rejected an age discrimination claim by a former union president who
alleged that a newly adopted salary structure that had eliminated his
133
salary had an age-based disparate impact.
The court was troubled
both that there was no indication that the plaintiff’s age was a factor
in the decision, whether stated or unstated, and that the plaintiff could
134
not establish that others would be similarly affected.
The court
seemed to be concerned that the employer’s decision was not
sufficiently linked—either through veiled intent or impact—to the
protected category of age.
At least two other decisions state that they reject sex-based
disparate impact claims because the challenged employment decisions
were “isolated incidents.” In Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., the court
127

609 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 711–13.
129 Id. at 712.
130 Id. at 718.
131 This concern seems misplaced because an employer’s good faith efforts typically are
not considered as part of a disparate impact claim, which addresses discriminatory impact
rather than intent.
132 See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 346 (6th ed. 2003).
133 135 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1998).
134 Id. at 26.
128
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rejected a challenge by a pregnant female attorney who was also the
only part-time employee, that the elimination of her position had a
135
The court first rejected her disparate
sex-based disparate impact.
treatment claim because her position was terminated before her
136
employer learned that she was pregnant.
The court then rejected
her disparate impact claim based both on the conclusion that the
decision to eliminate her position was only an isolated, one-time
decision and not an employment practice, and on the plaintiff’s failure
to prove that an alleged policy of terminating part-time employees
137
would have a disparate impact on women.
According to the court,
the plaintiff’s cited studies, showing that the majority of part-time
workers were women with child-care responsibilities, were not
sufficiently “indisputable” for the court to take judicial notice of
138
them.
The decision has been criticized as improperly relieving the
employer of any obligation to demonstrate that its criteria were
139
consistent with business needs.
Its limited reasoning—both with
respect to the reason why the decision doesn’t qualify as a sufficiently
specific practice and why the proffered studies were rejected without
analysis—offers little guidance for future courts.
Similarly, in Wynn v. Columbus Municipal Separate School
District, the court rejected a female athletic coach’s challenge to her
school board’s decision to combine the position of head football
coach and athletic director because the decision effectively precluded
140
women from the position.
The court rejected the plaintiff’s
proffered statistical proof based on the conclusion that the job
description would have a disparate impact on both men and women
because both men and women would not be qualified for the position
141
as it had been structured.
In its focus on the statistical deficiencies,
the court stated that “discriminatory impact cannot be established by
142
one isolated decision such as the one involved here.”
Because she
was the only female coach who had ever applied, she could not
establish that the requirement would have the actual effect of

135

118 F.3d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1156.
137 Id. at 1156–57.
138 Id.
139 Travis, supra note 20, at 43; see also, e.g., Grossman, supra note 21, at 617
(critiquing the decision).
140 692 F. Supp. 672, 682–83 (N.D. Miss. 1988).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 684.
136
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excluding a disproportionate number of women.
The court
required a comparison of the female coaches who had applied to and
been rejected for the position of athletic director because of their lack
144
of qualifications for the job of head football coach.
Thus, even
though the court stated that it rested its decision, at least in part, on
the plaintiff’s failure to identify a “particular employment practice,”
the court’s reasoning focused more on the perceived lack of disparate
145
impact.
One could imagine the “practice” being framed in terms of
the changed job description combining the football coach and athletic
director positions. So framed, a court might have reached a different
result. Notably, the court upheld the plaintiff’s disparate treatment
146
claim.
Thus, despite a number of decisions involving “single employment
decisions” that seemingly reject cases based on the failure to satisfy
the “particular employment practice” requirement, in fact, only a few
cases actually stand for the premise that the “practice” must affect
more than a single employee, and even those may be explained by
other concerns. Nevertheless, courts have interpreted the “particular
employment practice” requirement narrowly in related contexts even
when not addressing whether the challenged practice constituted a
“single employment decision.” Grossman and Travis detail courts’
narrow interpretations of the “particular employment practice”
requirement in a number of cases with claims involving “caregiving”147
related employment decisions.
Some of these decisions insulate
traditional practices, particularly practices involving leaves, from
148
But other courts have recognized similar
disparate impact review.
leave policies as “particular employment practices” that had a sex-

143

Id.
Id. at 683.
145 See discussion of proper comparison groups infra Part I.C.
146 Wynn, 692 F. Supp. at 686.
147 See Grossman, supra note 21, at 617–18; Travis, supra note 20, at 39–46.
148 Travis, supra note 20, at 39–46. For example, in Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
the court characterized the employer’s policy offering employees with more than three
absences during a ninety-day probationary period (which disproportionately affected
pregnant women) as a challenge to the absence of sufficient leave. 282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th
Cir. 2002). In the court’s view, the leave policy would produce an effect that was contrary
to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s explicit refusal to guarantee leave to pregnant
employees, and the court refused to recognize a policy that it would subject to disparate
impact review. Id. at 861–62; see also Grossman, supra note 21, at 617; Travis, supra
note 20, at 43.
144
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149

based disparate impact.
Rather than reflecting a reasoned analysis
of the “single employment decision” requirement, some of these
decisions seem to turn on courts’ views that upholding the challenge
would be tantamount to requiring leave, which, in some courts’
views, is contrary to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), and
150
Whether or not that
which would be a “warrant for favoritism.”
judgment is correct, either as a normative matter or as a matter of
interpretation of the PDA’s reach, the decisions illustrate how
disparate impact decisions may instead reflect substantive policy
judgments when the claims invoke controversial national policy
151
issues such as comparable worth
or mandatory parenting leave.
Cases involving adverse actions taken against domestic violence
152
victims should not invoke those same concerns.
C. Establishing Impact
The next question is how a court would evaluate whether a claim
establishes the requisite statistical impact. Disparate impact theory
arose, and is most often used, in the context of exclusionary hiring
153
practices.
Accordingly, in analyzing impact, courts generally
compare the percentage of employees in the protected class in the
workplace with the percentage of qualified individuals in the relevant
154
population pool.
Indeed, employers are required to maintain
records of the impact of their “tests and other selection procedures”
155
on employment opportunities for those in protected classes.
The
so-called “four-fifths rule” provides that a selection rate for any
149 See, e.g., Williams & Bornstein, supra note 21, at 1344 n.228 (citing favorable
results in cases challenging an employer lifting requirement of 150 pounds, a police
department policy allowing light duty only for on-the-job injuries, and a policy that
employees could not use sick days to care for sick children).
150 Grossman, supra note 21, at 616 (noting cases that state the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act does not provide preferential treatment); see, e.g., Stout, 282 F.3d at
861–62 (rejecting a challenge to an absenteeism policy reasoning that to uphold challenge
would require special leave for pregnant employees).
151 See cases cited supra notes 104–10.
152 Indeed, at least some courts have recognized that an employer’s adverse action
against a domestic violence survivor would violate public policy. See sources cited supra
note 30.
153 Calaf, supra note 36, at 187; see also, e.g., Selmi, supra note 1, at 733–53 (arguing
that disparate impact theory has not been successful outside of cases challenging
employment tests).
154 See, e.g., LEX K. LARSON, 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 22.02 (Lexis 2d ed.
2011).
155 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (2010).
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protected group that is less than four-fifths of the rate for the group
with the highest selection rate will generally be regarded as evidence
156
Federal regulations directing employers how to
of adverse impact.
comply with antidiscrimination law’s disparate impact prohibition
recognize that smaller differences in selection rates may constitute an
adverse impact when the difference is significant statistically or
practically, or when the employer’s actions have disproportionately
157
discouraged applicants.
Similarly, greater differences in selection
rates may not constitute adverse impacts where the differences are
based on small numbers or where other factors, such as special
158
recruiting, impact the numbers.
This statistical calculation applies
most readily to hiring tests and explicit job requirements in which the
percentage of employees who identify as members of a particular
protected class can be compared against the relevant labor pool.
With an employment practice such as a decision to terminate,
transfer, or demote an individual worker, the comparison works
somewhat differently. Courts that have addressed these cases have
taken different approaches, but their results vary and often employ
limited analyses. The Supreme Court has made clear that no rigid
mathematical formula is required in order to establish a disparate
159
impact.
Instead, courts are directed to judge the significance of the
160
Some courts have
disparity flexibly on a case-by-case basis.
161
Others explicitly
permitted proof without relying on statistics.
recognize that cases in which there is a “paucity” of statistics may
162
nevertheless reflect impermissible disparate impact discrimination.
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s authority, however, some decisions
163
state that the plaintiff must present a statistical showing of impact,
156

Id. § 1607.4(D).
Id.
158 Id.
159 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994–95 (1988).
160 Id. at 995.
161 Shoben, supra note 2, at 606 (citing Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp. of Texas, 97 F.3d
810, 814 (5th Cir. 1996)); accord Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece:
Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1123 & n.224
(2010).
162 Thomas v. Wash. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 926 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding a
disparate impact challenge to nepotism and word-of-mouth job posting practices).
163 Grossman, supra note 21, at 618 (citing cases). The cases raise the question whether
courts insist on statistical evidence because it is doctrinally required or because it affords a
justification for rejecting a claim about which the court is unsympathetic. For example, in
Lang v. Star Herald, the court rejected the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim because the
plaintiff provided no statistical support for her challenge to the newspaper’s policy of
157
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and some seem to require a workplace large enough to establish a
164
statistically significant claim.
In the domestic violence context, one question will be whether a
plaintiff must establish proof of a disparate impact on her workplace
165
or whether proof of impact on the general population will suffice.
Some courts evaluate the impact of the decision on the protected class
166
generally.
Courts seem to be most willing to use general
population statistics in cases in which the decision is based on some
characteristic that is closely related to membership in the protected
class, what might be called a “class-linked” characteristic. For
example, courts in some of the cases involving “no-beard” policies
have recognized that those policies would have a disparate impact on
African American males, given their vulnerability to
167
pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB).
A number of courts have upheld
disparate impact challenges to “no-beard” policies based on evidence
of how that policy would affect the class (African American males)
168
generally.
However, at least one court required proof that the “noallowing indefinite unpaid leaves of absence but with no guarantee that the employer
would hold open the employee’s position. 107 F.3d 1308, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997). Like
cases described in notes 148 and 150, supra, the court may have been unwilling to issue a
decision it viewed as requiring an employer to offer a particular type of leave. Similarly,
in Maganuco v. Leyden Community High School District 212, the court ostensibly required
statistics but did so in the course of rejecting a claim that, in the court’s view, would
require the employer to extend the maternity leave it already offered. 939 F.2d 440, 443–
44 (7th Cir. 1991).
164 See, e.g., Lang, 107 F.3d at 1314 (noting employee’s concession that employer was
too small for statistical analysis); Council 31, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v.
Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting the potential difficulty in establishing the
requisite statistical impact in cases involving “single decisions”).
165 See Flagg, supra note 42, at 2026–27 (recognizing the issue); Grossman, supra note
21, at 618 (citing cases).
166 See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 939 F.2d 610, 612–13 (8th Cir. 1991)
(upholding a disparate impact claim involving a “no-beard” policy based on studies and
expert testimony that policy discriminates against black males who disproportionately
suffer from skin disorder brought on by shaving); accord Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l
Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding a disparate impact claim concerning
a pregnancy-related leave without analysis of statistical impact in plaintiff’s workplace).
167 PFB is a skin disorder resulting from ingrown hairs when people with certain kind of
hair are clean shaven. If affects virtually only African American males. See, e.g., Equal
Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 56 (D. Colo. 1981)
(discussing medical evidence).
168 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. at 56–59
(rejecting the argument that statistics regarding percentage of African American men in
defendant’s workforce would preclude disparate impact claim based on “no-beard”
policy); accord Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing
the district court’s conclusion that a “no-beard” policy has a disparate impact on African
American males); Johnson v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 713 F. Supp. 244, 247 (W.D. Tenn.
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beard” policy had a disparate impact in the defendant’s workplace
itself. In that case, it may have mattered that the protected group was
169
In
well represented in the workplace notwithstanding the policy.
the case of a class-linked policy such as a “no-beard” policy,
requiring proof that the policy has had a disparate impact on the
protected group’s representation at a particular workplace would seem
to hide the fact that the policy would have a disproportionate negative
effect on African Americans overall. Employment decisions based on
an employee’s experience with domestic violence would be similarly
class linked, given its predominant impact on women. Disparate
impact claims brought on the basis of abuse similarly should be
analyzed in terms of their impact in the general population rather than
in the plaintiff’s workplace itself.
Courts have used general population statistics in cases challenging
pregnancy or caregiving-related policies when the criteria at issue are
arguably class linked. For example, in Roberts v. United States
Postmaster General, the court found that a policy prohibiting an
employee from using her accumulated sick leave to attend to family
170
members’ medical needs may have a sex-based disparate impact.
That policy could be seen as class linked, given women’s
disproportionate assumption of caregiving responsibilities. In a
similar ruling, the court in Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc. found
1989) (recognizing that a “no-beard” policy would have racial disparate impact unless the
employer allowed a medical exception to accommodate PFB); Richardson v. Quik Trip
Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151, 1155 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (same). But see, e.g., Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 190–93 (3d Cir. 1980)
(rejecting a claim based on the plaintiff’s failure to prove that a “no-beard” policy had a
racially discriminatory impact in defendant’s workforce). Even cases rejecting challenges
to “no-beard” policies did so based on a finding crediting the defendant’s satisfaction of
the business necessity defense rather than the absence of a disparate impact. See, e.g.,
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1118 (11th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a claim based
on business necessity grounds, while “assuming” that firefighters adequately pled prima
facie case that a “no-beard” policy had racial disparate impact); Stewart v. City of
Houston, No. H-07-4021, 2009 WL 2849728 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2009) (upholding a “nobeard” policy for uniformed officers based on evidence that facial protective equipment
could not safely be worn with a beard); Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35,
42 (E.D. Va. 1976) (recognizing that a “no-beard” policy had “some discriminatory
impact” but finding the policy justified by a legitimate business purpose).
169 See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d at
190–93 (rejecting a claim based on failure to prove that a “no-beard” policy had a racially
discriminatory impact in the defendant’s workforce).
170 947 F. Supp. 282, 289 (E.D. Texas 1996). Although the court relied on the general
assertion that the policy would have a disparate impact on women due to their “more
frequent role as child-rearers,” the court did not elaborate on the type of proof the plaintiff
would be required to provide to ultimately prevail.
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that a rule barring pregnancies in single employees would have a
gender-based disparate impact based on higher fertility rates among
171
The explicit distinction based on
black women in the population.
the status of being unmarried and pregnant could be seen as a classlinked criterion that should be evaluated in terms of its impact on the
general population, not on a particular workforce. Similarly, other
courts have used general population statistics in recognizing that
pregnancy and caregiving-related policies might have a disparate
172
impact.
At the same time, other courts have used the plaintiff’s
173
workplace as a comparator and nevertheless upheld claims.
On the other hand, some courts, particularly in cases challenging
policies that could be seen as less closely class linked, have rejected
claims based on the absence of proof that the policy
disproportionately affected members of a protected class in the
174
plaintiff’s workplace.
As with cases analyzing whether the
decision satisfied the “single employment decision” requirement, a
close look reveals that some of these decisions seem driven by
substantive policy-related concerns rather than by the plaintiff’s
175
failure to establish impact per se.
For example, some decisions
171

834 F.2d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 1987).
For example, one court recognized that a policy requiring nurses to lift over 150
pounds might have a disparate impact on pregnant woman. See Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp.
of Tex., 97 F.3d 810, 812 (5th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 143 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting the claim based on a lack of evidence that no pregnant woman could lift 150
pounds). In another case, the court recognized that a policy limiting temporary
employees’ leave to ten days affected women more severely than men. Abraham v.
Graphic Arts Int’l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
173 See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp.
647, 651–55 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that a policy requiring employees to work for one
year before taking paid sick leave had a disparate impact on pregnant women); Germain v.
County of Suffolk, No. 07-CV-2523, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45434 (E.D.N.Y. May 29,
2009) (holding that a policy limiting light-duty assignments only to officers who suffer
occupational injuries had a disproportionate impact on pregnant women).
174 See, e.g., Kelber v. Forest Elec. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 326, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(rejecting a challenge to absenteeism and job assignment policies by an electrician who
was fired for excessive pregnancy-related absences both because she failed to identify a
specific policy and because she failed to establish impact); Davidson v. Franciscan Health
Sys., 82 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774–75 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (rejecting the challenge to a twentysix-week leave policy by an employee who already had taken a leave absent evidence that
any other employee who had been terminated for exceeding the policy was pregnant); see
also, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1034 (1986) (criticizing disparate impact theory for requiring
proof of impact on a particular employer’s workplace over a limited time period); Porter,
supra note 36, at 294–95 (recognizing cases requiring workplace statistics); Tarr, supra
note 36, at 393–94 (same).
175 See supra notes 106–14 and accompanying text.
172
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suggest an unwillingness to use disparate impact doctrine to disturb
176
Others
settled workplace policies such as light-duty assignments.
reflect a view that granting the plaintiff’s claim would effectively
authorize “preferential treatment” for pregnant employees, a policy
177
determination Congress explicitly rejected in the PDA.
Other
courts have recognized, or have assumed for purposes of analysis, that
the plaintiff may have established a prima facie case, but found that
178
the employer nevertheless established a business necessity.
Overall, this body of decisions offers little analysis of the proper
statistical comparison courts should use when cases invoke statistics.
One of the most extensive discussions can be found in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Warshawsky & Co., in
which the court considered a challenge that the employer’s policy
requiring all employees to work at least one year before they were
eligible for sick leave had a disparate impact based on pregnancy and
179
sex.
The court rejected the statistical approaches urged by both
parties and concluded that the applicable comparison was the
percentage of females terminated because of the policy during their
first year with the percentage of males similarly terminated during
180
that same period.
That approach seems reasonably suited to the
176 See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting a nurse’s assistant’s challenge to a policy limiting modified duty to employees
who suffered from work-related injuries absent evidence that the policy had a
disproportionate impact on pregnant employees); Dimino v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 64 F.
Supp. 2d 136, 157–58 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (rejecting a challenge to a policy prohibiting light
duty for medically limited employees absent evidence that women transit workers lose
more work time than men due to policy); Woodard v. Rest Haven Christian Servs., No. 07C-0665, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21086 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2009) (rejecting a nurse’s
challenge to a policy limiting light-duty work to those who are disabled on the job because
the plaintiff did not present evidence of impact at her place of employment).
177 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1314–16 (11th Cir.
1994); Maganuco v. Leyden Cmty. High Sch. Dist., 939 F.2d 440, 443–44 (7th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting the challenge to a policy requiring teachers to use either sick leave or maternity
leave based on the plaintiff’s failure to establish that women who have been disabled due
to pregnancy accumulate sick days at a greater rate annually than male coworkers or
women who have not experienced pregnancy-related disability; concluding that the effect
instead was to prevent women who choose to remain at home after the end of pregnancyrelated disability from using sick days to cover periods of disability); see also supra note
163 and accompanying text.
178 See, e.g., Ahmad v. Loyal Am. Life Ins. Co., 767 F. Supp. 1114, 1115 (S.D. Ala.
1991); Porter v. Kansas, 757 F. Supp. 1224, 1230 (D. Kan. 1991).
179 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
180 Id. at 654. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission argued that the court
should compare the percentage of pregnant first-year employees who were discharged
because of the policy with the percentage of all nonpregnant first-year employees who
were discharged because of the policy. Id. at 651. By contrast, Warshawsky argued that
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particular policy involved, which was explicit and which would
operate affirmatively to terminate existing employees. But in cases of
single decisions that are either explicitly based on or have an impact
181
based on a class-linked characteristic, such as a “no-beard” policy,
182
or a
a policy banning braided, locked, or twisted hairstyles,
decision to terminate an employee because she has survived domestic
violence, an analysis of the impact of a decision on the plaintiff’s
workplace itself would not shed light on its overall effect. In those
cases, an evaluation of the impact of the decision on the population at
large seems the better approach.
D. Impact of Impact Analysis
By analyzing how disparate impact doctrine would apply to a
particular set of cases, this Article does not urge an expansion of the
doctrine; it simply evaluates infrequently explored aspects of the
doctrine and argues that some courts have interpreted statutory
requirements in an unduly restricted way. The impact of the analysis
likely will be limited, given the relatively specific nature of the claim
and its context. A disparate impact challenge brought by a domestic
violence survivor is different from many disparate impact cases in
that the decision does not involve an explicit policy. In that sense, it
differs, for example, from those cases involving pregnant women and
183
184
bearded men,
dress codes,
or cases involving “English-only”
185
because those challenges involve facially neutral but
rules,
expressly stated policies, whereas a domestic violence survivor may
be told that she was terminated because of the abuse, but the

the court should compare the number of pregnant first-year employees who required sick
leave with the nonpregnant first-year employees who required sick leave. Id. at 652. This
case illustrates the difficulty of identifying the appropriate comparison groups.
181 See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
182 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 161, at 37–39.
183 See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 1, at 749–53 (discussing cases); see also, e.g., Travis,
supra note 20, at 39–46 (discussing disparate impact challenges to caregiving-related
inequalities).
184 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
185 See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993); see also, e.g.,
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the García Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the
Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CALIF. L.
REV. 1347 (1997) (discussing cases).
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employment decision is unlikely to involve an officially stated
186
policy.
Of course, the decision to terminate a domestic violence survivor
may be seen as similar to other challenges that generally have not
succeeded. For example, a claim by a survivor who was terminated
due to excessive absenteeism (related to the abuse) may be seen as a
challenge to the employer’s (gender-neutral) absenteeism policy.
That challenge could be seen as similar to challenges to absenteeism
policies brought by employees seeking pregnancy or childcare leave.
However, cases involving domestic violence survivors generally
should not invoke the same policy-based concerns to which courts
187
have alluded in those cases.
Alternately, claims by domestic
violence survivors may be seen as similar to the often unsuccessful
challenges brought to dress codes or “English-only” policies because
those cases may be seen as involving issues of the employee’s
188
choices.
Regardless whether that distinction is correct, it should
not apply to cases involving adverse actions against domestic
violence survivors, because in those cases the employee’s
circumstances are caused by the abuser’s, not the employee’s,
189
conduct.
CONCLUSION
This Article has evaluated the question of whether adverse
employment actions taken against survivors of domestic violence
should be subject to disparate impact challenges. The Article reviews
objections that may be raised and concludes that those arguments
should not bar claims outright. The issue offers one example of ways
in which cramped doctrinal interpretations contribute to a perception
that disparate impact theory is unavailable, particularly outside the
testing context. This Article challenges that perception. The Article
shows how adverse employment actions taken against domestic
186 Of course, a domestic violence survivor who is terminated for the ostensible reason
that she violated a standing workplace rule, for example, that she had excessive absences,
could bring a disparate impact challenge to the impact of that policy on domestic violence
survivors. Framed that way, she likely would have difficulty establishing that the overall
impact of that policy had a discriminatory effect, both because of the relatively small
percentage of survivors likely to be affected and because the employer likely would
successfully defend the business necessity of a generic absentee policy.
187 See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
188 See Flagg, supra note 42, at 2028.
189 Indeed, any decision based on the employee’s role in the abuse, absent additional
facts, would perpetuate a stereotype of its own.
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violence survivors fall within the scope of neutral employment
decisions the Court and Congress have recognized may perpetuate
impermissible discrimination.
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